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AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
MILLER, ADAMS AND CRAWFORD 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, dba 
MAC CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
corporation, LONNY ADAMS, 
GLENDA ADAMS, GERALD CRAWFORD, 
DIANE CRAWFORD and LENORA 
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Clerk, Supremo Court, Utah! 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE ASSOCIATE 
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
The respondents present this Petition for a 
rehearing of the above cause, and in support thereof respect-
fully show: 
1. The appeal in this cause was argued before 
this Court on October 12, 1976. 
2. On December 7, 1976, this Court rendered its 
decision in favor of the appellant and against the respond-
ents, reversing the judgment of the District Court. 
3. The respondents seek a rehearing upo;* the 
following grounds: 
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(a) The requirement that a secured party 
give notice to a debtor prior to disposal of collateral 
cannot be waived. 
'(b) Failure to comply with the notice 
requirement bars a deficiency; or alternatively, ntandates a 
hearing as to the value of the collateral with the burden 
on the secured party, 
(c) Upon such other and further grounds as 
set forth in respondents1 accompanying Brief, 
For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that this 
Petition be granted. 
Dated this 11th day of January, 1977. . 
"'•* ] Respec t fu l ly submi t t ed , 
FOX, EDIV^DS 5 PLUMB,, 
By 
Attorneys for Respondents 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-0444 
n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• ^ 
On this 11th "day of January, 1977, I mailed a 
true copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing, by first-
class mail with postage thereon fully prepaid, to J. Anthony 
Eyre, Esq., of Kipp § Christian, attorneys for the-appellant 
herein, at 520 Boston Building 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
1^JUM1977 
BR\G\:A:.\ roum UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Ckri Law School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT AND 
SUPREME COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I 
POINT II 
THE REQUIREMENT THAT A SECURED 
PARTY GIVE NOTICE TO A DEBTOR 
PRIOR TO DISPOSAL OF COLLATERAL 
CANNOT BE WAIVED. , , 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE 
REQUIREMENT BARS A DEFICIENCY; OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, MANDATES A HEARING 
AS TO THE VALUE OF THE COLLATERAL 
WITH THE BURDEN ON THE SECURED 
PARTY 
CONCLUSION 7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Aimonettov v, Keepes, 11 U.C.C, Rep. Serv, 
1081 (Wyoming Supreme Court, 1972) , , , . , 5 
Motor Contract Co. of Atlanta v. Sawyer, 
8 U.C.C. Rep, Serv. 1122 (Georgia 
Court of Appeals, 1971) , 4 
Nelson v. Monarch Investment Plan of 
Henderson, Inc., 7 U.C.C, Rep. Serv. 
394 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 
1970) 5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES CITED 
Section 70A-9-501, Utah Code Ann , 3 
Section 70A-9-501 C3) , Utah Code Ann 3, 4 
Section 70A-9-504C3), Utah Code Ann , . , , , . 3, 4 
5 
Section 70A-9-505Q), Utah Code Ann,, , , . » . , , , , 4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
MILLER, ADAMS and CRAWFORD 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, dba 
MAC CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
corporation, LONNY ADAMS, 
GLENDA ADAMS, GERALD CRAWFORD, 
DIANE CRAWFORD and LENORA 
PHILLIPS, 
Defendants/Respondents, 
Case No. 14444 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, American States Insurance (hereinafter 
"American") brought an action against respondents (hereinafter 
"Miller"), for breach of an indemnity agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT AND SUPREME COURT 
Default judgment was entered against Miller (R.28). 
After the judgment, American disposed of collateral given by 
Miller without attempting to give Miller notice of the 
disposition (R.62, 68). Miller moved to compel satisfaction 
of the judgment (R.43, 45) and the court granted the motions 
(R. 131, 136). On December 7, 1976, the Supreme Court filed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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an opinion reversing the District Court, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Miller seeks modification of the Supreme Court!s 
earlier opinion by either (1) an order denying American the 
right to collect any deficiency or (2) an order directing 
the District Court to take evidence on the value of the col-
lateral security which was sold without notice to satisfy 
Miller1s debt, 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The court is referred to Miller*s statement of facts 
in his initial brief filed with the court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE REQUIREMENT THAT A SECURED PARTY GIVE NOTICE 
TO A DEBTOR PRIOR TO DISPOSAL OF COLLATERAL 
CANNOT BE WAIVED 
The court in its opinion as filed December 7, 1976, 
placed considerable emphasis on the freedom of the parties to 
contract beyond the scope of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
Specifically, with regard to the requirement, under the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code, that the secured party give notice 
to a debtor prior to disposition of collateral, the court 
stated its opinion as follows: 
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Under 70A-9-501, in the case of the "debtor's" 
default under a security agreement, as here, the 
secured party has rights and remedies provided therein, 
except as limited by subsection {$) , which provides 
that the rules included in the subsection therein-
below (including 70A-9-504(3), which in turn required 
notice to the debtor of the secured party*s intention 
to dispose of the security to satisfy the debt), could 
not be waived, "but the parties may by agreement 
determine the standards by which the fulfillment of 
these rights and duties is to be measured if such 
standards are not manifestly unreasonablef*f 
It would appear that the Court took the position 
that the notice requirement as imposed by the Uniform Commer^ 
cial Code is not absolute, but can be modified or even sup-? 
planted by the parties in an arm's-length transact ion, if the 
result would not be manifestly unreasonable. In other words, 
the Court apparently concluded that notice is not required 
regarding the sale of the collateral, where the parties 
agreed to waive any notice, 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code 7QA*9*5 04 subsection 
(3) reads as follows, in part: 
• . • Unless collateral is perishable or threatens 
to decline speedily in value or is of a type custom-
arily sold on a recognized market, reasonable 
notification of the time and place of any public 
sale or any reasonable notification of the time 
after which any private sale or other intended 
disposition is to be made shall be sent by the 
secured party to the debtor. . , . 
The duty to give notice to the debtor is therefore mandatory, 
Section 70A-9-501 (3) of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code provides that the mandatory duty cannot be waived: 
To the extent that they give rights to the debtor 
and impose duties on the secured party, the rules 
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stated in the subsections referred to below may 
not be waived or varied • ,
 t 
(b) Subsection (.3) of Section 7QA-9-504 and 
subsection p.) of Section 70A-9-505 which deal 
with disposition of collateral, 
This provision does say that the parties may by 
agreement determine the standards by which mandatory duties 
will be fulfilled. This, however, does not mean that the 
parties may negate by agreement a non-waivable requirement 
of the Code. 
With respect to the issue at hand, the parties 
cannot waive notice, but they could by agreement determine 
how, where and when to give the required notice. For example, 
if the parties were to agree that only one day's notice would 
be sufficient, then the courts could uphold the freedom of 
the parties to establish such notice, if not unreasonable. 
In another case, the parties might agree to provide ten (10) 
days1 notice, and a court may, however, determine this to be 
unreasonable given the particular facts. The point is that 
notice must be given, but within the framework of that 
mandatory requirement, the parties may determine the nature 
and form of such notice. 
This view of 70A-9-501(3) is supported by the case 
law. In the case of Motor Contract Company of Atlanta v. 
Sawyer, 8 U.CC. Rep. Serv, 1122 (Georgia Court of Appeals, 
1971), the issue before the court was the reasonableness of 
notice to be given a debtor. Section 9-501(3) of the Code was 
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quoted, noting the right of the parties to set the standard 
for fulfillment of the duty to give notice. In other words, 
the notice requirement was held to be absolute; the provision 
permitting the parties to set their own standards relative to 
the fulfillment of the notice requirement was the only ques-
tion. See also Nelson v. Monarch Investment Plan of Henderson, 
Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 394 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 
1970). 
Noteworthy is the recent Wyoming Supreme Court 
decision of Aimonettov v. Keepes, 11 U,C.C. Rep. Serv. 1081 
(Wyoming Supreme Court, 1972), which held that compliance with 
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 70A-9-504(3), 
requiring notice to the debtor of the secured partyTs proposed 
sale of the collateral after default, is a condition precedent 
to the recovery by the secured party of any deficiency between 
the sale price of the collateral and the amount of the unpaid 
balance. 
The result of the Supreme Court's opinion in this 
case is to permit a secured party, without notice to the debtor, 
to dispose of collateral and thereafter obtain a deficiency 
judgment, despite the directive and mandatory language of the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code that notice must be given and 
cannot be waived, Utah, therefore, becomes so far as Miller's 
research has indicated, the only jurisdiction in the United 
States with such a rule, 
- •;, 
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Miller respectfully petitions the court to review 
its prior opinion and modify it, so as to require that the 
notice provisions at issue of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
be complied with, 
POINT II 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
BARS A DEFICIENCY; OR ALTERNATIVELY, MANDATES 
A HEARING AS TO THE VALUE OF THE COLLATERAL 
WITH THE BURDEN ON THE SECURED PARTY 
The Uniform Commercial Code itself does not set forth 
the course of action to be taken when the secured party sells 
the collateral without notice to the debtor. However, two 
lines of cases have developed suggesting and outlining the 
proper response of the courts to such a problem. One line 
of cases has taken the position that the security holder who 
sells his security without notice is barred from collecting 
any deficiency. The court is referred to the cases cited at 
pages 12, 13, 14 and 15 of Miller's original brief to the court, 
American, in its brief, cited a line of cases 
taking a different approach, wherein it is suggested that the 
proper procedure should be that the court hold a hearing 
regarding the fair market value of the collateral disposed 
of by the secured party, Americans brief, pp. 18-19. At 
such a hearing the burden of proof is upon the secured party 
to demonstrate that the collateral was sold at its fair 
market value. 
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CONCLUSION 
> • ' i ' • I J i 
Miller urges the Court to reconsider its earlier 
opinion and hold that it is a mandatory, non-waivable duty 
for a secured party to give notice to a debtor prior to dis-
posal of collateral• This duty having been affirmatively 
established, the Court is urged to adopt one of the two 
alternative approaches taken by other courts where notice 
has not been given; that is, either declare no deficiency may 
be had; or adopt the position of the two concurring justices 
in this case, wherein it was suggested on remand that evi-
dence be taken with respect to the fair market value of the 
collateral disposed of without notice by the secured party. 
At such hearing, in accordance with American's own brief, 
the burden of proof should be placed upon American, the secured 
party, to show that the collateral was sold for its full, 
fair market value. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Respondents 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-0444 
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On this 11th day of January, 1977, I mailed a 
true copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondents, by first-
class mail with postage thereon fully prepaid, to J, 
Anthony Eyre, Esq., of Kipp § Christian, attorneys for the 
appellant herein, at 520 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
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